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We propose a quantum key distribution scheme that combines a biased basis choice with
the decoy-state method. In this scheme, Alice sends all signal states in the Z basis and
decoy states in the X and Z basis with certain probabilities, and Bob measures received
pulses with optimal basis choice. This scheme simplifies the system and reduces the ran-
dom number consumption. From the simulation result taking into account of statistical
fluctuations, we find that in a typical experimental setup, the proposed scheme can in-
crease the key rate by at least 45% comparing to the standard decoy-state scheme. In the
postprocessing, we also apply a rigorous method to upper bound the phase error rate of
the single-photon components of signal states.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD)1, 2 is one of the most realistic applications in quantum infor-
mation. It aims at extending a secret key between two distant parties, commonly noted as Alice
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and Bob. The unconditional security has been proven even when an eavesdropper, Eve, has
unlimited computation power permitted by quantum mechanics3–6.
The best known protocol of QKD is the BB84 protocol1 presented by Bennett and Bras-
sard in 1984. In BB84, Alice encodes the key information randomly into the X and Z bases
and sends quantum pulses to Bob. Bob measures the received pulses in two bases randomly.
After that, they compare the basis through an authenticated classical channel. The key can only
be extracted from the pulses where they use the same basis and this results in that on average
half of the raw data is discarded. That is, the basis-sift factor is 1/2 in the original BB84 proto-
col. This factor can be improved by the efficient BB84 scheme proposed by Lo et al. 7. In the
efficient scheme, Alice and Bob put a bias in the probabilities of choosing the Z basis and X
basis, which can make the basis sift-factor close to 100% in the infinitely long key limit. The
efficient BB84 scheme is experimentally demonstrated in 20098.
In practical QKD systems, a highly attenuated laser or a weak coherent state source is
widely used to substitute for a perfect single-photon source which is beyond state-of-the-art
technology. A weak coherent state source contains multi-photon components (details shown in
Methods). When multi-photon states are used for QKD, Eve can launch attacks, like the photon-
number-splitting (PNS) attack9, 10, to break the security. Since Eve could have a full control of
the quantum channel, she can make the transmittance of multi-photon states to be 100% in the
PNS attack. In a conventional security analysis11, Alice and Bob have to assume all the losses
and errors come from the single-photon components in the worst scenario case. As a result, the
performance of QKD is very poor. To improve the performance of the weak coherent state QKD,
Hwang proposed the decoy-state method12. Instead of sending one coherent state, Alice sends
pulses with different intensities, so that she can obtain more information to monitor the quantum
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channel. To maintain the detection statistics of coherent states with different intensities, Eve is
not able to change the transmittances of single-photon and multi-photon state freely without
being noticed by Alice and Bob. The security of the decoy-state method is proven13, along with
various practical schemes14, 15. Follow-up experimental demonstrations show that the decoy-
state method is a very effective way to improve QKD performance16–20.
Naturally, we can improve the decoy-state method by applying the biased-basis idea of
the efficient BB84 protocol. There are a few observations. First, Alice does not need to choose
basis when she chooses the vacuum decoy state. Second, if Alice and Bob mainly choose one
basis, say Z basis, for key generation, they effectively treat X basis as for quantum channel
testing. In this sense, the functionality of X basis is similar to the decoy states. Intuitively, one
may expect to combine decoy states and X basis together.
Here, we propose a new decoy-state method with biased basis choice, following the
widely used decoy-state scheme, vacuum+weak decoy-state method15 (a quick review is shown
in Methods), where Alice sends out pulses with three different intensities, vacuum (with an
intensity of 0), weak decoy (with an intensity of ν) and signal (with an intensity of µ) states.
1. Alice prepares all the signal pulses (µ) in the Z basis, where the final secure key is
extracted from.
2. She prepares weak decoy pulses (ν) in the X and Z with certain probabilities.
3. If she chooses the vacuum decoy state, she does not need to set any basis.
4. Bob measures the received pulses in the X basis and Z basis with probabilities px and pz,
respectively.
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The scheme is summarized in Table 1. In the new scheme, only 4 sets of preparations are used
by Alice. Compared to the original vacuum+weak decoy-state method, where 6 sets are used,
the proposed scheme can simplify the system and reduce the cost of random numbers. Later in
the simulation, we will show that this scheme can also improve the QKD performance.
Following the GLLP security analysis11, the key generation rate13, 21 is given by
R ≥ q{−Iec +Qz1[1−H(epz1 )] +Q0},
Iec = fQµH(Eµ),
q =
Nµpz
Ntotal
,
(1)
where q is the raw data sift factor, including basis-sift factor and signal-state ratio; Iec is the cost
of error correction and the rest terms in the bracket is the rate of privacy amplification; f is the
error correction inefficiency; Qµ and Eµ are the overall gain and quantum bit error rate (QBER);
Qz1 is the gain of the single-photon components and e
pz
1 is its corresponding phase error rate;
Q0 is the background gain; H(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary Shannon
entropy function. Note that in our scheme, the final key is extracted from Z-basis measurement
results, so all the variables in equation (1) should be measured in the Z basis. The phase error
rate epz1 cannot be measured directly, which, instead, can be inferred from the error rate in the
X basis22.
The gain and QBER, Qµ and Eµ, can be measured from the experiment directly. Alice and
Bob need to estimate Qz1 and e
pz
1 for privacy amplification. According to the model reviewed in
Methods, we have Qz1 = Y z1 µe−µ and Q0 = Y0e−µ, where Y z1 and Y0 are the yield of single-
photon components measured in the Z basis and background rate, respectively. In order to
lower bound the key rate equation (1), one can lower bound Y z1 , Y0 and upper bound epz1 .
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Since that both the vacuum state and the single-photon state are basis independent, the
yields of vacuum states and single-photon states in different bases are equal
Y x0 = Y
z
0 ,
Y x1 = Y
z
1 .
(2)
While a multi-photon state is basis dependent, whose basis information may be revealed to Eve
by, for example, PNS attack9, so for any i-photon state (i ≥ 2), in general,
Y xi 6= Y zi . (3)
That is, depending on the basis information, Eve may set the yield of i-photon state different
for the X and Z bases. As for the error rates, the phase error probability in the Z basis equals
to the bit error probability in the X basis
epz1 = e
bx
1 . (4)
Then, in the finite-key-size situation where statistical fluctuations should be taken into account22, 23,
we have
epz1 ≈ ebx1 . (5)
Given ebx1 , we can upper bound e
pz
1 by the random sampling argument (details shown in Meth-
ods). We need to point out that even though the single-photon state is basis independent, the
error rates in two basis may not be the same
ex1 6= ez1. (6)
This can be easily seen by considering a simple intercept-and-resend attack where Eve measures
all the pulses in the Z basis, and then she will not introduce any additional error in the Z basis
ez1 = 0, but ex1 = 1/2.
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Results
In our simulation, the parameters of the experimental setup are listed in Table 2. Statistical
fluctuations are taken into account in the simulation (details shown in Methods). We compare
the key generation rate in our scheme with that in the standard BB84 protocol with the vac-
uum+weak decoy-state scheme. The result is shown in Fig. 1.
As one can see from Fig. 1, the key rate of the proposed biased scheme is larger than that
of the standard BB84 with vacuum+weak decoy states by at least 45%. When the transmission
loss is 0, the key rate improvement can go up to 80%. As the transmission loss increases, the
improvement of the biased scheme decreases. This is because at a larger transmission loss,
more pulses for decoy states are needed and Bob also needs a larger px to estimate the privacy
amplification part in Eq. (1). The improvement comes from the fact that px is less than 1/2.
As px approaches to 1/2, the biased scheme becomes similar to the original scheme, where
px = pz = 1/2. It is an interesting prospective question how to apply our scheme to QKD
systems with high channel losses24.
For a practical QKD system, one needs to optimize the bias px for the key rate. The
dependence of the optimal bias on the transmission loss is shown in Fig. 2, from which we can
see that the optimal pz is about 0.95 when the transmission loss is below 3 dB and decreases as
the transmission loss increases. The minimal optimal pz is about 0.6, which is close to 1/2. That
is why our scheme approaches the standard BB84 with the vacuum+weak decoy-state scheme
as the transmission loss increases.
6
Discussion
In conclusion, we combine the decoy-state QKD with a biased basis choice to enhance the
system performance. The key point of our scheme is increasing the raw data sift factor by
setting all signal states in one (Z) basis. We take statistical fluctuations into account and use
a rigorous method to upper bound the phase error rate of the single-photon components of the
signal state. Comparing the result with that in the standard decoy-state BB84 protocol, we find
an improvement in the key generation rate. Meanwhile, we reduce the complexity of the QKD
system by assigning all signal states in the Z basis.
Methods
Model The weak coherent state source is equivalent to a photon-number channel model and its
photon number follows a Poisson distribution 15:
P (n) =
µn
n!
e−µ. (7)
Define Yi as the yield of an i-photon state; η as the transmittance of the channel measured
in dB; Y0 as the background count rate. Then, in a normal channel when there is no Eve’s
intervention, Yi is given by:
Yi = 1− (1− Y0)(1− η)i. (8)
The gain of i-photon states Qi is given by:
Qi = Yi
µi
i!
e−µ. (9)
The overall gain which means the probability for Bob to obtain a detection event in one pulse
7
with intensity µ is :
Qµ =
∞∑
i=0
Qi =
∞∑
i=0
Yi
µi
i!
e−µ. (10)
The error rate of i-photon states ei is given by
eiYi = e0Y0 + ed[1− (1− η)i](1− Y0), (11)
where ed is the probability that a photon hits the erroneous detector and e0 = 1/2. The overall
QBER is given by
EµQµ =
∞∑
i=0
eiYi
µi
i!
e−µ. (12)
Without Eve changing Yi and ei, the gain and QBER are given by
Qµ = 1− e−ηµ(1− Y0),
EµQµ = e0Y0 + ed(1− e−ηµ)(1− Y0)
(13)
Upper bound of epz1 Here, we review the random sampling argument 23: using the bit error
rate measured in the X basis, ebx1 , to estimate the phase error rate in the Z basis, e
pz
1 , for privacy
amplification.
If the key size is infinite, we know that ebx1 = e
pz
1 . Otherwise, given ebx1 , nx (the number
of decoy states that Alice sends and Bob measures in the X basis), and nz (the number of signal
states that Alice sends and Bob measures in the Z basis), we can give a probabilistic upper
bound of epz1 such that it is lower than e
pz
1 with a small probability Pθx
Pθx ≡ Pr{epz ≥ ebx + θx}, (14)
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where θx is the deviation of the phase error rate from the tested value. Here, Pθx is a controllable
variable and is equal to 10−7 in the simulation. We have
Pθx <
√
nx + nz√
ebx(1− ebx)nxnz
2−(nx+nz)ξx(θx), (15)
where the function ξx(θx) is given by
ξx(θx) ≡ H(ebx + θx − qxθx)− qxH(ebx)− (1− qx)H(ebx + θx), (16)
and qx = nx/(nx + nz). Given Pθx, we compute the value of ξx and find the value θx which is
the root of equation (16). We get the probabilistic upper bound
epzU1 = ebx + θx. (17)
Vacuum+weak decoy state In this protocol, Alice and Bob use two decoy states to estimate
the low bound of Y1 and the upper bound of e1. First, they implement a vacuum decoy state to
estimate the background counts in signal states
Qvacuum = Y0,
Evacuum = e0 =
1
2
.
(18)
Secondly, they perform a weak decoy state where Alice uses a weaker intensity ν (ν < µ)
for the decoy state to estimate Y1 and e1. We have:
Y1 ≥ Y L1 =
µ
µν − ν2
(
Qνe
ν −Qµeµ ν
2
µ2
− µ
2 − ν2
µ2
Y0
)
, (19)
and
e1 ≤ eU1 =
EνQνe
ν − e0Y0
Y L1 ν
. (20)
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Note that in our scheme all the parameters for estimating Y L1 are measured in the Z
basis and the parameters for estimating eU1 are measured in the X basis. And we must lower
bound Y0 to obtain the lower bound of the key rate15. The eU1 we get here will substitute ebx in
equation (14).
Statistical fluctuation Here, we consider statistical fluctuations for the decoy-sate method 15.
We need to modify the estimation of Y1, equation (19), and e1, equation (20).
The total number of pulses sent by Alice is composed of four cases
Ntotal = Nµ +N
z
ν +N
x
ν +N0. (21)
Since that Alice sends all signal states in the Z basis and the final key is only extracted from the
data measured in the Z basis, the parameter q in equation (1) is given by
q =
Nµpz
Ntotal
. (22)
We follow the statistical fluctuation analysis proposed by Ma et al.25.
QUµ = Qˆµ(1 +
uα√
NµpzQµ
),
QLν = Qˆν(1− uα√Nz
ν
pzQν
),
Y L0 = Yˆ 0(1− uα√N0Y0 ),
QL0 = Y
L
0 e
−µ(1− uα√
N0Q0
),
(23)
where Qˆµ, Qˆν and Yˆ 0 are measurement outcomes which means that they are rates instead of
probabilities. If we follow the standard error analysis assumption, uα is the number of standard
deviations one chooses for the statistical fluctuation analysis. Note that QUµ and QLν are used to
estimate Y L1 , so they should be measured in the Z basis. Here we use equation (14) to estimate
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the upper bound of epz1 with
nz = NµpzY
L
1 µe
−µ,
nx = N
x
ν pxY
L
1 νe
−ν .
(24)
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Table 1: List of Alice and Bob’s operations. Alice prepares and sends Ntotal pulses,
with Ntotal = Nµ + N zν + Nxν + N0. Bob measures the received pulses with certain
probabilities, pz + px = 1.
Alice prepares and sends Bob measures
Nµ signal pulses in the Z basis
N zν decoy pulses in the Z basis with probability pz in the Z basis
Nxν decoy pulses in the X basis with probability px in the X basis
N0 vacuum pulses
Table 2: List of experimental parameters for simulation.
Ntotal f ed Y0
6× 109 1.16 3.3% 1.7× 10−6
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Figure 1: Plot of key rate versus total transmittance. The solid line shows the result of our
scheme and the red line shows the result of the standard BB84 with the vacuum+weak decoy-
state method. The simulation parameters are shown in Table 2. The confidence interval for
statistical fluctuation is 5 standard deviations (i.e., 1 − 5.73 × 10−7). The expected photon
number of signal state µ is 0.479. For each transmission loss, we optimize all the parameters,
ν, Nµ, N
z
ν , N
x
ν , N0, pz, and px.
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Figure 2: Plot of optimal pz versus transmission loss.
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